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Abstract
In this study, we examine the effect of cross-border healthcare with public health insurance.
We consider its effect on healthcare quality, public health insurance, and income redistribution.
We use a two-country Hotelling model in which consumers are divided into two groups: high- and
low-income consumers. The governments, which aim to maximize consumers’ surplus, impose
an income tax on consumers to provide reimbursement for healthcare services and subsidy to
hospitals and improve income redistribution among consumers, and the hospitals decide their
healthcare quality to maximize their profits. Under these assumptions, we obtain the following
results. Promoting cross-border healthcare increases reimbursement for healthcare services and
improve healthcare quality in the patient-importing countries. On the other hand, the patient-
exporting countries do not always increase reimbursement or improve healthcare quality as part
of promoting cross-border healthcare. Further, when non-monetary frictions for cross-border
healthcare are low, income redistribution in the patient-exporting countries weakens as a result
of tax deduction to support cross-border patients.
1 Introduction
This study analyzes the effect of cross-border healthcare on the quality of healthcare as well as public
health insurance and income redistribution schemes. Although the globalization of healthcare has
been increasing, it is limited to a handful of wealthy households in countries pursuing universal
health coverage. This is because when patients receive medical treatment abroad, they do not use
(or face difficulty in using) public insurance. Thus, medical treatment abroad is fairly expensive
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as compared with treatment in the home country. In this regard, European Union (EU) countries
have been reforming their healthcare systems. In the EU, patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare
are authorized by a directive adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in 2011.1
This directive states that the costs of cross-border healthcare shall be reimbursed or paid directly
by the Member State up to an amount that would have been paid by the state, which implies
that patients can receive treatment abroad by paying the same fees as applicable in the home
country (although they must incur travel costs for the visit abroad). Therefore, this directive would
have a large impact on the demand for cross-border healthcare in the EU. Although expansion of
cross-border healthcare is expected to improve healthcare quality,2 it would influence the public
health insurance scheme if the costs of cross-border healthcare are reimbursed by the home country.
Additionally, since Glied (2008) shows that public health insurance reduces income inequality in a
nation, an income redistribution scheme would also be influenced through a change in the public
health insurance scheme. Therefore, the current study offers insight on how tax and social security
schemes are affected, before the real diffusion, by the implementation of cross-border healthcare
with reimbursement by public health insurance.
We use a two-country Hotelling model to study the effect of cross-border healthcare on health-
care quality, public health insurance, and income redistribution. Each country’s consumers are di-
vided into two groups: high- and low-income consumers. The governments, which aim to maximize
consumers’ surplus, impose an income tax on consumers to provide reimbursement for healthcare
services and subsidy to hospitals and improve income redistribution among consumers, and the
hospitals decide their healthcare quality to maximize their profits.
Under these assumptions, we obtain the following results. Countries that encourage hospitals
1Refer to directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council dated March 9, 2011, on the
application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.
2Previous literature shows that competition-inducing policies increase healthcare quality only under certain condi-
tions. For example, Gravelle and Sivey (2010) show that consumers better informed about hospitals lead to quality im-
provement only if the initial information was relatively imprecise, and/or the hospitals have similar quality-producing
technologies and, thus, provide similar quality in equilibrium. Brekke et al. (2011) show that easy access to health-
care always improves quality if the profit margin is positive, the marginal cost of treatment is constant, and the cost
for quality is independent of treatment volume; otherwise, easy access to healthcare has an indeterminate effect on
quality.
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to take in patients from a foreign country (hereafter patient-importing countries) increase reim-
bursement and improve healthcare quality. However, promoting cross-border healthcare does not
cause income redistribution in the country because the higher reimbursement, which incentivizes
hospitals to attract more foreign patients by improving their healthcare quality, is funded by the
income from foreign patients. On the other hand, countries that entrust their patients to hospitals
in a foreign country (hereafter the patient-exporting countries) do not always increase reimburse-
ment or improve healthcare quality as part of implementing cross-border healthcare. Although the
patient-exporting countries obtain the same effect as the patient-importing countries, a reduction
in the proportion of patients receiving healthcare services at a domestic hospital influences gov-
ernment strategies in the patient-exporting countries. Further, when non-monetary frictions for
cross-border healthcare are low, income redistribution in the patient-exporting countries weakens
as a result of tax deduction to support cross-border patients.
The present study is closely related to Andritsos and Tang (2013, 2014) and Brekke et al. (2014b,
2016), which analyze the effect of cross-border patient mobility with reimbursement under public
health insurance.3 Andritsos and Tang (2013) show that cross-border patient mobility decreases
waiting time if the reimbursement is fixed. Andritsos and Tang (2014) show that cross-border
patient mobility reduces reimbursement costs without increasing the patients’ waiting time. Brekke
et al. (2014b) show, assuming two regions that differ in healthcare technology, that the effect of
cross-border patient mobility depends on reimbursement from the patient-exporting region to the
patient-importing region. For example, if the reimbursement is equal to the marginal cost, quality
and welfare remain unchanged in the patient-importing region and quality decreases and welfare
increases in the patient-exporting region. Brekke et al. (2016) show, assuming three regions in
which the average income levels are different, that quality and welfare remain unchanged in the high-
income regions and that the effects on quality and welfare in the middle- and low-income countries
are ambiguous if reimbursement is equal to the marginal cost. Andritsos and Tang’s (2013, 2014)
3Brekke et al. (2014a) review the literature on cross-border patient mobility.
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models assume that governments decide reimbursement and operational capacity in healthcare,
whereas Brekke et al. (2014b, 2016) model local government decisions on the quality of healthcare
service under a given reimbursement condition. In reality, however, the governments of many
European countries have provided public hospitals semi-autonomy, empowering them to make key
strategic, financial, and clinical decisions themselves (Saltman et al., 2011). Therefore, the present
model assumes that governments decide the level of reimbursement to hospitals, and hospitals
decide the quality of healthcare services under the reimbursement offered by the governments.
Under this assumption, the governments cannot directly enforce provisions of healthcare services,
and reimbursement is endogenously decided by local governments. Further, the present study
considers the effect on income redistribution, unlike the above-mentioned studies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
presents the equilibrium quality of hospitals. Section 4 demonstrates the equilibrium strategies of
governments. Section 5 describes how the equilibrium property changes with continual expansion
of cross-border healthcare. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Model
Consider a healthcare market in which consumers (patients) are divided into two groups: high-
income (yH) and low-income (yL) consumers (yH > yL). Both groups are uniformly distributed
on a line L = [−1, 1]. The market is served by two healthcare providers (hospitals), located at the
endpoints of L. The market consists of two different countries, Country 1 and Country 2. The
consumers and the hospital located on the line segment L1 = [−1, 0] belong to Country 1, while the
remaining consumers and the hospital located on the line segment L2 = [0, 1], belong to Country
2. The population in each country is 1. The proportion of high-income consumers, denoted by
λi ∈ (0, 1) for country i, differs between the countries. Further, we assume that each consumer
demands one unit of healthcare (one treatment).
Governments. The government in each country collects income tax at the rate τi (i = 1, 2) from
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consumers and utilize the tax revenue to provide reimbursement for healthcare services and subsidy
to the hospital and its consumers.
The reimbursement per treatment of healthcare in Country i is denoted by pi. When the
consumers in Country i receive healthcare services from the domestic hospital, the government
pays pi to the hospital. When they receive healthcare services from the foreign hospital in Country
j, the government pays min{pi, pj} to the hospital.4 The subsidy to hospitals in each country
is fixed and denoted by Ti. The subsidy to consumers is equally distributed among them, and
the subsidy per consumer in Country i is denoted by si. Therefore, the budget constraint of the
government in Country i is given by
[λiy
H
i + (1− λi)yLi ]τi =

si + pi + Ti pi ≤ pj
si + (1− Φ)pi + Φpj + Ti pi > pj
. (1)
where i 6= j and Φ denotes the number of consumers who receive healthcare services from foreign
Country j.
Taxes on consumers and subsidies provided to them result in income redistribution among
consumers, and the redistributed income of high- and low-income consumers in Country i is obtained
as
yHi = (1− τi)yHi + si, (2)
and
yLi = (1− τi)yLi + si, (3)
respectively. Note that yHi = y
L
i = si when τ = 1; that is, perfect redistribution is achieved when
the tax rate is 100%.
Consumers. Each consumer demands one unit of healthcare (one treatment) from the most pre-
ferred hospital. The utility of a patient located at xi ∈ Li and treated by the hospital in Country
4EU directive 2011/24/EU expects that patients will be reimbursed the same amount as they would receive in
their own country for the same type of healthcare, and if the treatment abroad is cheaper than in the home country,
the reimbursement will reflect the real price of the treatment. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-13-
918 en.htm.
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j, located at zj , is given as follows.
5
U(xi, zj) =

v + bqj − t|xi − zj |+ u(yki ) if i = j
v + bqj − t|xi − zj |+ u(ykij)− F if i 6= j
(4)
where
ykij = y
k
i −max[pj − pi, 0]. (5)
v > 0 is the patient’s reservation benefits by being treated, and qj ≥ q is the quality offered by the
hospital in Country j with b > 0 measuring the marginal benefits of quality. The lower bound q
represents the lowest possible quality the hospitals can offer without being charged with malpractice
and is, for simplicity, normalized to 0. t|xi− zj | is the disutility from traveling to a hospital, which
is in proportion to the distance, u(·) is a utility function of consumption of goods and services
other than healthcare that satisfies the Inada conditions (u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) < 0, u′(0) = ∞, and
u′(∞) = 0). We assume that the price of goods and services other than healthcare services is one,
and consumers expend all of their income for goods and services. Therefore, u(·) is a function
of their redistributed income less copayment for healthcare. F is the non-monetary mobility cost
(disutility) of seeking care in a different region (because of the difference in language and culture,
as well as attachment, for example). We also assume that patients can receive healthcare from
the domestic hospital without a copayment, whereas patients who receive healthcare from the
foreign hospital have to make good the difference in reimbursement between the foreign and home
countries, max[pj − pi, 0], as a copayment for healthcare.6 Note that we can interpret t and F
as non-monetary friction parameters of cross-border healthcare. In these settings, a proportion of
consumers in the country with lower hospital quality receive cross-border healthcare services. In
other words, if qi > qj , a proportion of consumers in Country j receive healthcare services from
5Regarding the utility function in the present model, we basically follow the model presented by Brekke et al.
(2016). This utility function is separable into healthcare quality, distance, and consumption, and is justified because
distance is a major factor of patients’ choice of hospitals (see Tay (2003) and Beckert et al. (2012)), and because
healthcare service does not substitute for consumption of other goods and services.
6If reimbursement in the foreign country is lower than in the home country, consumers obtain reimbursement from
the home country up to the amount decided in the foreign country.
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Country i, and the amount is
Φ ≡ max{λjφH + (1− λj)φL, λjφH , 0}
=

1
2t
[
b(qi − qj) + λj(u(yHji )− u(yHj )) + (1− λj)(u(yLji)− u(yLj )))− F
]
if φH ≥ φL > 0
λj
2t
[
b(qi − qj) + (u(yHji )− u(yHj ))− F
]
if φH > 0 ≥ φL
0 if 0 ≥ φH ≥ φL
(6)
where
φk ≡ 1
2t
[
b(qj − qi) + (u(ykij)− u(yki ))− F
]
. (7)
Note that φH ≥ φL because u(ykij)− u(yki ) < 0, u′(ykij)− u′(yki ) > 0, and yHij ≥ yLij . In other words,
high-income consumers tend to prefer high-quality hospitals in the foreign country as compared to
low-income consumers, because the marginal utility for consumption other than healthcare services
is smaller for high-income consumers than for low-income consumers, whereas the marginal benefits
from healthcare services are the same between high- and low-income consumers.
Hospitals. If Country i faces a demand for Di treatments, the profit earned from providing these
treatments with quality qi is given by
pii = (pi − c)Di −G(qi) + Ti, (8)
where c > 0 is the marginal cost of treatment and G(qi) denotes the costs for providing healthcare
quality, qi.
7 We assume that G′(qi) > 0, G′′(qi) > 0, and G′′′(qi) ≥ 0.
3 Hospitals’ choice of quality: Second-stage outcome
In this section, we consider a two-stage game in which hospitals choose the quality of their healthcare
services. In the first stage, the government in each country chooses a tax rate (τi), the subsidy to
7For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of quality provision is independent of treatment volume, implying
that quality is a public good for hospital patients. This is a widely used assumption in the theoretical literature on
quality competition between hospitals (see, e.g., Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2002; and Gravelle and Sivey, 2010).
7
consumers (si), the reimbursement per unit of healthcare (pi), and the subsidy to the hospital (Ti)
to maximize total consumer utility in the country,
max
τi,si,pi,Ti
∫
xi∈Li
max{U(xi, zi), U(xi, zj)} (9)
under the budget constraint (1) and a non-negative profit constraint, pii ≥ 0. In the second stage,
hospitals choose the quality of their healthcare services to maximize their profits, maxqi pii.
Since Di = 1 + Φ and Dj = 1− Φ when qi ≥ qj , we obtain
∂pi(qk)
∂qk
= −G′(qk) +

b
2t(pk − c) if φH ≥ φL > 0
λjb
2t (pk − c) if φH > 0 ≥ φL
0 if 0 ≤ φH ≤ φL
, where k = i, j. (10)
The equilibrium quality, q∗i , q
∗
j is one of the following cases: (1) q
∗
i = q
∗
j = 0, (2) q
∗
i = q
∗(pi) > q∗j =
0, and (3) q∗i = q
∗(pi) > q∗j = q
∗(pj) where
G′(q∗(pi)) =

b
2t(pi − c) if φH(q∗i , q∗j ) ≥ φL(q∗i , q∗j ) > 0
λib
2t (pi − c) if φH(q∗i , q∗j ) > 0 ≥ φL(q∗i , q∗j )
. (11)
When some consumers receive cross-border healthcare services, the demand for healthcare ser-
vices is elastic to the quality of healthcare, and hospitals improve the quality of their healthcare
services as long as their marginal revenue is larger than the marginal cost of quality improvement.
Since higher reimbursement increases the marginal revenue of hospitals, governments can influence
hospitals’ healthcare quality by changing the reimbursement level. On the other hand, when no
consumer receives cross-border healthcare, the demand is inelastic to healthcare quality, and hos-
pitals cannot increase their revenue through quality improvement. Therefore, hospitals provide the
minimum quality-of-service regardless of reimbursement level, and governments cannot influence
quality changes in hospitals’ healthcare services.
Additionally, we obtain the following lemma on the relationship between reimbursement per
treatment and equilibrium quality.
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Lemma 1. If Country i takes in foreign patients from Country j, the reimbursement per treatment
is larger in Country i than in Country j. That is, if qi > qj, pi > pj.
Proof. Assume qi > qj . SinceG(q) is an increasing function, in order to satisfy (11), b(p1−c)/(2t) >
b(p2 − c)/(2t) (that is, pi > pj) has to be satisfied. 
Lemma 1 implies that the equilibrium reimbursement per treatment is larger in the patient-
importing country than in the patient-exporting country. Therefore, in an equilibrium, the budget
constraint (1) is rewritten as
[λiy
H
i + (1− λi)yLi ]τi = si + pi + Ti. (12)
4 Governments’ choice of reimbursement levels and redistribution
of income: First-stage outcome
In this section, as a benchmark case, we first derive the equilibrium in which no consumer receives
cross-border healthcare services because of a large t or F and/or no public insurance scheme for
cross-border healthcare. In the second, we derive the equilibrium in which a proportion of consumers
receive healthcare services.
4.1 Closed-border case.
When no consumer receives cross-border healthcare services in the equilibrium, every consumer
receives healthcare from the domestic hospital. Therefore,
∫
xi∈Li
max{U(xi, zi), U(xi, zj)}dxi =
∫
xi∈Li
U(xi, zi)dxi
= v + bq∗(pi)− 1
2
t+ λiu(yHi ) + (1− λi)u(yLi ). (13)
As Section 3 shows, when no consumer receives cross-border healthcare services, the government
cannot induce hospitals to change their quality of healthcare through reimbursement, pi, and the
subsidy to hospital, Ti. Therefore, the government decides pi and Ti so that the profits of hospitals
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are equal to 0, satisfying the non-negative profit constraint of hospitals. Since the costs of hospitals
are c+G(q∗i ), in equilibrium, p
∗
i + T
∗
i = c+G(q
∗
i ), so the budget constraint (12) is
[λiy
H
i + (1− λi)yLi ]τi = si + c+G(q∗i ). (14)
From the budget constraint, we obtain dτi/dsi = [λiy
H
i + (1− λi)yLi ], which gives
d
dτi
∫
xi∈Li
U(xi, zi)dxi = λiu
′(yHi )
(
dyHi
dτi
+
dyHi
dsi
dsi
dτi
)
+ (1− λi)u′(yLi )
(
dyLi
dτi
+
dyLi
dsi
dsi
dτi
)
= λi(1− λi)(yH − yL)(u′(yLi )− u′(yHi )) (15)
and we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. We consider a closed-border equilibrium, in which the tax rate is equal to 1. The
subsidy to consumers is equal to the tax revenue less hospital costs. The sum of reimbursements
and hospital subsidy is equal to the hospital costs. Further, the equilibrium quality of healthcare
services is at the minimum level.
Proof. Since u′(yLi ) > u
′(yHi ) except for τ = 1, (d/dτi)
∫
xi∈Li U(xi, zi)dxi > 0 for τ ∈ [0, 1), and
the proposition is proved. 
Since the government cannot control the quality of healthcare services that hospitals provide,
it sets the reimbursement level and subsidy to hospitals so as to satisfy the non-negative profits
constraint of hospitals. This setting is similar to the diagnosis-related group (DRG)-based payment
that most countries have adopted. Consequently, the quality level of healthcare service is minimal.
Additionally, since the utility for consumption other than healthcare is concave, this marginal
utility is larger for low-income consumers than for high-income consumers. Thus, the government
can improve total consumer utility by income redistribution from high- to low-income consumers.
Accordingly, the government collects all income from consumers and redistributes the amount
equally among them after deducting hospital costs.
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4.2 Cross-border case
Patient-importing countries. Every consumer in Country i, which imports patients, receives health-
care from the domestic hospital. Therefore,
∫
xi∈Li
max{U(xi, zi), U(xi, zj)}dxi =
∫
xi∈Li
U(xi, zi)dxi
= v + bq∗(pi)− 1
2
t+ λiu(yHi ) + (1− λi)u(yLi ). (16)
The government in Country i chooses the reimbursement level (pi), tax rate (τi), and subsidy (si,
Ti) to maximize (16) under the budget constraint (12) and a non-negative profits constraint, pii ≥ 0.
If pi and Ti are fixed, from (12), we obtain
ds
dτ
∣∣∣∣
pi and Ti is fixed.
= λiy
H + (1− λi)yL, (17)
which gives
d
dτi
∫
xi∈Li
U(xi, zi)dxi
∣∣∣∣
pi and Ti is fixed.
= λiu
′(yHi )
(
dyHi
dτi
+
dyHi
dsi
dsi
dτi
)
+ (1− λi)u′(yLi )
(
dyLi
dτi
+
dyLi
dsi
dsi
dτi
)
= λi(1− λi)(yH − yL)(u′(yLi )− u′(yHi )) (18)
and, in turn, the following lemma:
Lemma 2. In the patient-importing country, total consumer utility is maximum at τ = 1 for any
values of pi.
Proof. Since u′(yLi ) > u
′(yHi ) except for τ = 1, (d/dτi)
∫
xi∈Li U(xi, zi)dxi > 0 for τ ∈ [0, 1), and
the lemma is proved. 
The marginal utility for consumption other than healthcare is larger for low-income than high-
income consumers regardless of hospital quality level. Therefore, as described in the closed-border
case, the government collects all income from consumers and redistributes the amount equally
among them after deducting hospitals costs.
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Substituting τi = 1 into (12), (2), and (3), we obtain pi = λiy
H
i + (1 − λi)yLi − si − Ti and
yHi = y
L
i = si, which lead to
∂
∂si
∫
xi∈Li
U(xi, zi)dxi
∣∣∣∣
τi=τ∗i =1
= b
dq∗(pi)
dpi
∂pi
∂si
+ λiu
′(si) + (1− λi)u′(si)
= −bdq
∗(pi)
dpi
+ u′(si), (19)
and
∂
∂Ti
∫
xi∈Li
U(xi, zi)dxi
∣∣∣∣
τi=τ∗i =1
= b
dq∗(pi)
dpi
∂pi
∂Ti
= −bdq
∗(pi)
dpi
< 0, (20)
and, in turn, to the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In an equilibrium, the government of the patient-importing country chooses the
tax rate as 1, and the reimbursement level and subsidy for consumers, so as to equalize the marginal
benefits from reimbursement and subsidy. Further, the government chooses the minimum subsidy
to the hospital that satisfies the non-negative profit constraint of the hospital.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the cross-border case, the government has the power to induce hospitals to improve the
quality of their healthcare services by increasing the reimbursement level, which in turn increases
consumers’ benefits. However, an increase in reimbursement decreases the subsidy to consumers,
which reduces consumers’ benefits. Therefore, the government balances reimbursement and subsidy
so as to equalize the marginal benefits between them. Consequently, the reimbursement is more
than c. Additionally, the profit of the hospital might be more than 0 when b is sufficiently large.
Therefore, Proposition 2 implies that, with a significant expansion in cross-border healthcare, the
hospital would change from the conventional DRG-based payment systems.
Patient-exporting country. We consider Country j in which a proportion of consumers receive
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cross-border healthcare services. The total consumer utility is given as∫
xj∈Lj
max{U(xj , zj), U(xj , zi)}dxj = v + bq∗(pi)[λjφH + (1− λj)φL] + bq∗(pj)[λj(1− φH)
+ (1− λj)(1− φL)] + λj [φHu(yHji ) + (1− φH)u(yHj )] + (1− λj)[φLu(yLji) + (1− φL)u(yLj )]
− λjt
[∫ φH
0
(1 + x)dx+
∫ 1
φH
(1− x)dx
]
− (1− λj)t
[∫ φL
0
(1 + x)dx+
∫ 1
φL
(1− x)dx
]
− F [λjφH + (1− λj)φL]. (21)
The government in Country j chooses reimbursement level (pj), tax rate (τj), and subsidy (sj ,
Tj) so as to maximize (21) under the budget constraint (12) and the non-negative profit constraint,
pii ≥ 0. If pj and Tj are fixed,
d
dτj
∫
xj∈Lj
max{U(xj , zj), U(xj , zi)}dxj
∣∣∣∣∣
pj and Tj are fixed.
= λj [b(q
∗(pCi )− q∗(pCj ))
+ (u(yHji )− u(yHj ))− 2tφH − F ]
dφH
dτ
+ (1− λj)[b(q∗(pCi )− q∗(pCj )) + (u(yLji)− u(yLj ))
− 2tφL − F ]dφ
L
dτ
+ λj
[
φHu′(yHji )
(
dyHji
dτj
+
dyHji
dsj
dsj
dτj
)
+ (1− φH)u′(yHj )
(
dyHj
dτj
+
dyHj
dsj
dsj
dτj
)]
+ (1− λj)
[
φLu′(yLji)
(
dyLji
dτj
+
dyLji
dsj
dsj
dτj
)
+ (1− φL)u′(yLj )
(
dyLj
dτj
+
dyLj
dsj
dsj
dτj
)]
(22)
Substituting (2), (3), (7), and (17) into (22), we obtain
d
dτj
∫
xj∈Lj
max{U(xj , zj), U(xj , zi)}dxj
∣∣∣∣∣
pi and Tj are fixed.
= λj(1− λj)(yH − yL)
× [φLu′(yLji) + (1− φL)u′(yLj )− φHu′(yHji )− (1− φH)u′(yHj )], (23)
which leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In an equilibrium, the average marginal utility of low- and high-income consumers is
equal.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The right side of (23) is equal to 0 when τ = 1, because yHji = y
L
ji, y
H
j = y
L
j , and φ
H = φL
when τ = 1. Therefore, when τ = 1, the first-order condition to maximize total consumer utility is
satisfied. However, total consumer utility is not always maximum at τ = 1.
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Proposition 3. When t is sufficiently large, the equilibrium tax rate is equal to 1. On the contrary,
when t is sufficiently small, the equilibrium tax rate is below 1, because the second-order condition
to maximize total consumer utility is not satisfied.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 3 implies that an expansion in cross-border healthcare resulting from a reduction
in the disutility from traveling to a hospital (t) influences income redistribution in the patient-
exporting country. In other words, total consumer utility in the patient-exporting country does not
necessarily increase by redistributing income to low-income consumers from high-income consumers.
The reason for this result is that high-income consumers tend to visit a hospital abroad more
than low-income consumers do. Since consumers who receive treatment abroad have to make a
copayment, the marginal utility of high-income consumers who receive treatment abroad is not
always higher than that of low-income consumers who receive treatment in their home country.
In particular, if the difference in redistributed income is sufficiently small between high- and low-
income consumers, the marginal utility of high-income consumers who receive treatment abroad is
lower than that of low-income consumers who receive treatment in their home country. Therefore, if
τ is close (but not equal) to 1 and the ratio of high-income consumers receiving healthcare services
from the foreign hospital (φH) is sufficiently larger than that of low-income consumers receiving
healthcare services from the foreign hospital (φL), redistributing income to low-income consumers
from high-income consumers decreases total consumer utility. We consider an extreme case, in
which φH = 1 and φL = 0. In this case, the marginal utility of high-income consumers is u′(yHji )
and that of low-income consumers is u′(yLj ). If τ is close (but not equal) to 1, u
′(yHji ) > u
′(yLj ).
Thus, redistributing income to low-income consumers from high-income consumers decreases total
consumer utility in this case.
As (7) shows, the difference between φH and φL is larger when t is smaller. Therefore, if t is
sufficiently small, total consumer utility is maximized at a tax rate below 1.
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If τj is fixed,
d
dsj
∫
xj∈Lj
max{U(xj , zj), U(xj , zi)}dxj
∣∣∣∣∣
τj is fixed.
= λj [b(q
∗(pCi )− q∗(pCj ))
+ (u(yHji )− u(yHj ))− 2tφH ]
dφH
dτ
+ (1− λj)[b(qC(pCi )− q∗(pCj )) + (u(yLji)− u(yLj ))
− 2tφL]dφ
L
dτ
+ b
dq∗(pj)
dpj
dpj
dsj
[λj(1− φH) + (1− λj)(1− φL)]
+ λj
[
φHu′(yHji )
(
dyHji
dsj
+
dyHji
dpj
dpj
dsj
)
+ (1− φH)u′(yHj )
dyHj
dsj
]
+ (1− λj)
[
φLu′(yLji)
(
dyLji
dsj
+
dyLji
dpj
dpj
dsj
)
+ (1− φL)u′(yLj )
dyLj
dsj
]
(24)
From (12), ∂pj/∂sj = −1. Additionally, from (2), (3), and (5), we obtain ∂yHj /∂sj = ∂yHji /∂sj =
∂yLj /∂sj = ∂y
L
ji/∂sj = 1 and ∂y
H
ji /∂pj = ∂y
L
ji/∂pj = −1. Thus,
∂
∂sj
∫
xj∈Lj
max{U(xj , zj), U(xj , zi)}dxj
∣∣∣∣∣
τj is fixed.
= [λj(1− φH) + (1− λj)(1− φL)]
×
[
λj(1− φH)u′(yHj ) + (1− λj)(1− φL)u′(yLj )
λj(1− φH) + (1− λj)(1− φL) − b
dq∗(pj)
dpj
]
, (25)
which is positive when
b
dq∗(pj)
dpj
<
λj(1− φH)u′(yHj ) + (1− λj)(1− φL)u′(yLj )
λj(1− φH) + (1− λj)(1− φL) . (26)
The left-hand side of this equation indicates marginal benefits for reimbursement, and the right-
hand side represents the average marginal utility from consumption other than healthcare services
for consumers who receive healthcare services from the domestic hospital. An increase in reimburse-
ment decreases subsidy to consumers, resulting in a decrease in consumption other than healthcare
services. Therefore, the government increases (decreases) reimbursement if the marginal benefit of
healthcare services from an increase in reimbursement is greater (smaller) than the marginal loss
of consumption other than healthcare services for consumers who receive healthcare services from
the domestic hospital.
As well as the government in the patient-importing country, the government in the patient-
exporting country also balances reimbursement and subsidy so as to equalize the marginal benefits
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between the two. However, note that the government in the patient-exporting country takes care
of only consumers who receive healthcare services from the domestic hospital, because the quality
of the domestic hospital does not influence the benefits to patients who receive healthcare services
at the foreign hospital.
Accordingly, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When b is sufficiently small or consumers’ income (yH and yL) is sufficiently low,
the equilibrium subsidy to consumers is equal the tax revenue less hospital costs and the equilibrium
reimbursement is so small that the hospital would choose minimal quality. Otherwise, the equilib-
rium subsidy to consumers and reimbursement to the hospital is so determined that the marginal
benefits from an increase in reimbursement is equal to the marginal losses from a decrease in sub-
sidy for consumers who receive healthcare services from the domestic hospital. The equilibrium
subsidy to the hospital is determined as the minimum value so as to satisfy the non-negative profits
constraint of the hospital.
Proof. See Appendix D.
4.3 Sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Having clarified the equilibrium strategies of the two governments in both the closed- and cross-
border cases, we describe the equilibrium property in the two countries in which income distribution
among consumers is different.
Proposition 5. We assume that λ1 > λ2. When b is sufficiently small, t is sufficiently large, F
is sufficiently large, or consumers’ income (yH and yL) is sufficiently low, no consumer receives
cross-border healthcare services and the quality level of the hospitals is minimal. Otherwise, Country
1 (Country 2) imports (exports) patients, and the reimbursement is larger and quality higher in
Country 1 than in Country 2.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The larger t and F are, the greater is the frictional force against foreign healthcare services.
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Additionally, since healthcare services are luxury goods,8 low income can become an impediment
to foreign healthcare services. Further, if b is sufficiently small, a minimum quality of healthcare
services would be the best from the point of the view of social welfare. Accordingly, even if
cross-border healthcare is permitted, no consumer receives cross-border healthcare services in the
equilibrium for some range of parameters.
When some consumers receive cross-border healthcare services, the quality of healthcare is
different between countries. The larger the total income, the larger the tax revenue. Further, the
larger the total income, the lower the marginal utility from consumption other than healthcare.
Therefore, a country with a large total income spends more money on reimbursement to hospitals
and provides higher quality healthcare than a country with a relatively low total income.
4.4 Impacts of Border Openings
From Propositions 1 and 5, we present the healthcare impacts of opening the border as the following
proposition.
Proposition 6. If provision of cross-border healthcare induces some consumers to access cross-
border healthcare services, the equilibrium quality of hospitals in at least the patient-importing coun-
try and the total consumer utility in both countries increase in cross-border healthcare compared to
closed-border healthcare.
Proof. Proposition 5 shows that the equilibrium hospital quality is higher in the patient-exporting
country compared to the patient-importing country, which means that cross-border healthcare
increases the equilibrium quality of hospitals in at least the patient-importing country. If the
equilibrium quality is greater than 0, the benefit from a quality upgrade over 0 outweighs its
cost; thus, the total consumer utility increases with cross-border healthcare provision. Even if the
equilibrium quality remains at 0 in cross-border healthcare, utility is greater for patients who cross
the border compared to those under closed-border healthcare. Therefore, cross-border healthcare
8This is because the utility function of consumption of goods and services other than healthcare services is concave
for consumption.
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increases total consumer utility in both countries if cross-border healthcare provision induces some
consumers to access cross-border healthcare services. 
When some consumers receive cross-border healthcare services, the patient-importing country
provides an incentive to hospitals to take in foreign consumers. Therefore, the quality of healthcare
in the patient-importing country improves through border openings for healthcare. On the other
hand, the patient-exporting country does not need to provide an incentive to hospitals to take
in foreign consumers; thus, the patient-exporting country cannot always improve the quality of
healthcare by opening the border for healthcare.
According to Proposition 3, an equilibrium tax rate below 1 implies that opening of the border
weakens income redistribution. However, Proposition 6 shows that cross-border healthcare increases
total consumer utility even if cross-border healthcare weakens income redistribution. This implies
that cross-border healthcare enables consumers to receive high-quality healthcare services in a
foreign country and that their benefits outweigh the losses from the weakened income redistribution.
5 Discussion
This section examines, through comparative statics of the parameters t and F , how the equilibrium
property changes as cross-border healthcare continually expands.
When t and F are sufficiently large in an equilibrium, no patient receives cross-border health-
care services in either country. In this equilibrium, governments do not provide an incentive for
hospitals to improve their quality. Thus, the equilibrium property does not change if any of the
parameters, including t and F , change. When t and F decrease below their respective threshold
values, the equilibrium property discontinuously changes. In the changed equilibrium, a proportion
of consumers in Country 2 cross the border, and reimbursement is larger and quality of healthcare
services better in Country 1 than in Country 2, as the previous propositions show.
When a proportion of consumers in Country 2 receive cross-border healthcare services in an
equilibrium, the government of at least Country 1 provides an incentive for hospitals to improve the
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quality of their healthcare services, and the lower t, as a direct effect, provides a greater incentive
for the governments to increase reimbursement to hospitals, as shown in (11). The government
of Country 2 also has the same incentive if the hospital in Country 2 provides higher-than-the-
minimum healthcare quality. In addition to the direct effect of a decrease in t, three indirect effects
occur, when a proportion of consumers in Country 2 receive cross-border healthcare services. First,
a decrease in t induces patients to move from Country 2 to Country 1, increasing (decreasing) the
revenue of the hospital in Country 1 (Country 2). This movement reduces (increases) the subsidy to
hospitals and increases (decreases) reimbursement and hospital quality if the governments provide
subsidy to their hospitals (Ti > 0). Second, a decrease in t causes an increase in φ
H and φL, larger in
the former than in the latter, when the equilibrium tax rate in Country 2 is below 1, as shown in (7).
The right-hand side of (26) is greater because the increases in φH and φL differ. In other words,
a decrease in t increases the average marginal utility for consumption of other than healthcare
services by the consumers of Country 2. A higher average marginal utility provides the government
in Country 2 an incentive to increase subsidy to consumers and decrease reimbursement. Finally,
the right-hand side of (23) changes because the increases in φH and φL differ. In particular, when
u′(yHji ) − u′(yHj ) ≥ u′(yLji) − u′(yLj ), the right-hand side of (23) decreases. Thus, a lower t reduces
the equilibrium tax rate in Country 2. Decreasing the equilibrium tax rate reduces the tax revenue
and, in turn, the equilibrium reimbursement and quality in Country 2.
A lower F has no direct effect because it does not incentivize hospitals to improve the quality
of their services, as shown in (11). On the other hand, it has three indirect effects, because a
lower F induces patients to move from Country 2 to Country 1. However, note that the number of
patients moving from Country 2 to Country 1 with a decrease in F is the same between high- and
low-income consumers. Therefore, the equilibrium reimbursement and quality changes following a
decrease in F are different from those caused by a decrease in t
Accordingly, the effect of a decrease in t and F on equilibrium reimbursement and quality, when
a proportion of consumers in Country 2 receive cross-border healthcare services, is summarized in
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the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Assume that a proportion of consumers in Country 2 receive cross-border health-
care services in equilibrium. A decrease in t and F increases the equilibrium reimbursement and
quality in the patient-importing country. However, the effect of a decrease in t and F on the
equilibrium reimbursement and quality in the patient-exporting country is ambiguous.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we examined the effect of cross-border healthcare with public health insurance. The
main findings are as follows. First, the implementation of cross-border healthcare induces at least
the patient-importing country to increase reimbursement to hospitals and improve their quality.
Second, the patient-exporting country exerts indirect negative effects on quality improvement.
Therefore, quality improvement in the patient-exporting country through continual expansion in
cross-border healthcare is ambiguous. Finally, huge expansion in cross-border healthcare in the
patient-exporting country resulting from a reduction in non-monetary friction influences income
redistribution.
The present model implicitly assumes that income redistribution does not influence the total
amount of wealth. Under this assumption, governments will redistribute consumers’ income equally;
however, it does not reflect the real situation. Since income redistribution would influence the total
amount of wealth, governments will not conduct a perfectly equal income redistribution. Even if we
consider the effect of income redistribution on the total amount of wealth, the equilibrium depends
on the marginal benefits from healthcare and the marginal utility from consumption other than
healthcare. Therefore, the essential results would not change, but a more precise analysis should
be considered in future research.
Further, the present model assumes profit-maximizing hospitals and governments that aim
to maximize consumers’ utility. We can also assume altruistic hospitals or welfare-maximizing
governments. However, the effect uncovered by this model is not lost even under this assumption.
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This is because altruistic hospitals consider profits and welfare-maximizing governments consider
consumers’ utility as part of their objective. However, it would involve additional effects, which
should be clarified in future research.
References
[1] Andritsos D. A. and Tang, C. S. (2013) The impact of cross-border patient movement on the
delivery of healthcare services, International Journal of Production Economics, 145, 702–712.
[2] Andritsos D. A. and Tang, C. S. (2014) Introducing competition in healthcare services: The
role of private care and increased patient mobility, European Journal of Operational Research,
234, 898–909.
[3] Barros, P. P. and Martinez-Giralt, X. (2002) Public and private provision of health care,
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 11, 109–133.
[4] Beckert, W., Christensen, M., Collyer, K. (2012) Choice of NHS-funded hospital services in
England, Economic Journal, 122, 400–417.
[5] Brekke K. R., Siciliani, L., and Straume, O. R. (2011) Hospital competition and quality with
regulated prices, The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 113, 444–469.
[6] Brekke K. R., Levaggi, R., Siciliani, L., and Straume, O. R. (2014a) Patient Choice, Mobility
and Competition Among Health Care Providers, In: Levaggi, R. and Montefiori M. (Eds.),
Developments in Health Economics and Public Policy, 12, Springer, 140–157.
[7] Brekke K. R., Levaggi, R., Siciliani, L., and Straume, O. R. (2014b) Patient mobility, health
care quality and welfare, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 105, 140–157.
[8] Brekke K. R., Levaggi, R., Siciliani, L., and Straume, O. R. (2016) Patient mobility and health
care quality when regions and patients differ in income, Journal of Health Economics, in press,
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.05.003
21
[9] Gravelle, H., Sivey, P. (2010) Imperfect information in a quality-competitive hospital market,
textitJournal of Health Economics, 29, 524–535.
[10] Glied, S. A. (2008) Health care financing, efficiency, and equity, NBER Working Paper 13881,
National Bureau of Economic Research. Lyon, 1999
[11] Saltman, R. B., Dura´n, A., and Dubois, H. F. W. (Eds.) (2011) Governing public hospitals:
Reform strategies and the movement towards institutional autonomy, WHO, London.
[12] Tay, A. (2003) Assessing competition in hospital care markets: the importance of accounting
for quality differentiation, textitRAND Journal of Economics, 34, 786–814.
Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 2. From Lemma 2, total consumer utility is also maximum at τ = 1
under equilibrium reimbursement. Therefore, the equilibrium tax rate in country i, τ∗i , is equal
to 1. Since the hospital in the patient-importing country has higher quality than that in the
patient-exporting country, the quality of the hospital in the patient-importing country is more
than minimum quality level. Therefore, (11) is satisfied in the equilibrium in which a proportion
of consumers in Country j receive healthcare services from Country i, which means that p∗i must
be more than c. Additionally, when si = 0, the right-hand side of (19) is positive infinity because
u(0) = ∞. Thus, s∗i must be more than 0. Therefore, p∗i and s∗i are not corner solutions, and
thus, the right-hand side of (19) is equal to 0 in the equilibrium. As (20) shows, an increase in
Ti decreases total consumer utility. Therefore, T
∗
i is the minimum value to satisfy a non-negative
profits constraint. 
B. Proof of Lemma 3. As shown in (23), the necessary condition for an interior solution is
φLu′(yLji) + (1− φL)u′(yLj ) = φHu′(yHji )− (1− φH)u′(yHj ), (27)
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which implies that the average marginal utility of low-income consumers equals that of high-income
consumers. This condition is satisfied when τ = 1 which is a corner solution. Further, since u′(0)
is infinite, the equilibrium tax rate is more than the lower bound of τ that satisfies a non-negative
profits constraint of the hospital and the budget constraint. Accordingly, this lemma is proved. 
C. Proof of Proposition 3. We define yj ≡ yHj |τ=1 = yLj |τ=1 = λjyH + (1− λj)yH − pj − Tj and
yji ≡ yHji |τ=1 = yLji|τ=1 = yj − (pCi − pj). The second-order condition to maximize total consumer
utility under τ = 1 is
d2
dτ2j
∫
xj∈Lj
max{U(xj , zj), U(xj , zi)}dxj
∣∣∣∣∣
pi and Tj are fixed and pj<pCi .
= λj(1− λj)(yH − yL)2
×
[
λj
{
(u′(yLji)− u′(yLj ))2
2t
+ φLu′′(yLji) + (1− φL)u′′(yLj )
}
+(1− λj)
{
(u′(yHji )− u′(yHj ))2
2t
+ φHu′′(yHji ) + (1− φH)u′′(yHj )
}]
. (28)
This condition is satisfied when
(u′(yji)− u′(yj))2 + 2t[Φu′′(yji) + (1− Φ)u′′(yj)] < 0. (29)
The first term of the left-hand side in (29) is positive and the second term of the left-hand side in
(29) is negative. If t is sufficiently small, the second term is close to 0, and thus, the second-order
condition is not satisfied. When the second-order condition is not satisfied, total consumer utility
is not maximum at τ = 1. In other words, it is maximum at τ < 1. If t is sufficiently large, the
second-order condition is satisfied. Additionally, when t is sufficiently large, φH and φL is close to
0, in which the right-hand side of (23) is positive. Therefore, total consumer utility is maximum at
τ = 1. 
D. Proof of Proposition 4. When b is sufficiently small or consumers’ income (yH and yL)
is sufficiently low, (26) is satisfied at any sj that satisfies the budget constraint (12). Since the
costs of hospitals are paid from the government’s budget, the equilibrium subsidy to consumers
is equal to the amount deducting the costs of hospitals from tax revenue when b is sufficiently
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small or consumers’ income (yH and yL) is sufficiently low. If (26) is not always satisfied in the
budget constraint (12), the left-hand side of (26) must be equal to the left-hand side of (26) in the
equilibrium. Further,
∂
∂Tj
∫
xj∈Lj
max{U(xj , zj), U(xj , zi)}dxj
∣∣∣∣∣
pi and sj are fixed.
= b
dq∗(pj)
dpj
∂pj
∂Tj
[λj(1− φH) + (1− λj)(1− φL)]
= −bdq
∗(pj)
dpj
[λj(1− φH) + (1− λj)(1− φL)] < 0, (30)
which implies that an increase in Tj decreases total consumer utility. Therefore, the equilibrium
subsidy to a hospital is determined as a minimum value so as to satisfy a non-negative profits
constraint of a hospital. 
E. Proof of Proposition 5. When t is sufficiently large or F is sufficiently large, no consumer
receives cross-border healthcare services, because the friction of cross-border healthcare is very
large. Therefore, the governments do not give an incentive to a hospital in order to raise its quality,
and the quality level of the hospitals is minimum.
When b is sufficiently small or consumers’ income (yH and yL) is sufficiently low, the right-
hand side of (19) is positive at any si that satisfies the budget constraint (12). Therefore, the
equilibrium reimbursement to a hospital is so small that the equilibrium quality of the hospital
in the patient-importing country would be minimum. Accordingly, the equilibrium quality of the
hospital is minimum in both countries, and no consumer receives cross-border healthcare services.
If some consumers receive cross-border healthcare services and the equilibrium tax rate is 1 in
both countries, the first-order conditions to maximize total consumer utility with regard to p and s
are identical in both countries, and they are b(dq∗(p)/dp) = u′(s) and s+p+T = λyH +(1−λj)yL.
Since λ1 > λ2, s1 > s2 if p1 = p2. Therefore, p1 must be larger than p2 to satisfy the first-order
conditions. Further, when the equilibrium tax rate is less than 1 in Country 2, the tax revenue
becomes smaller than when the tax rate is 1, which implies that the equilibrium reimbursement
to a hospital becomes smaller than when the tax rate is 1. Accordingly, when some consumers
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receive cross-border healthcare services, the equilibrium reimbursement is larger in Country 1 than
in Country 2.
From (11), the quality of the hospital becomes larger as the reimbursement increases. Therefore,
the equilibrium quality is also larger in Country 1 than in Country 2. 
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